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Abstract
We present several philosophical ideas
emerging from the studies of complex systems. We
make a brief introduction to the basic concepts of
complex systems, for then defining “abstraction
levels”. These are useful for representing
regularities in nature. We define absolute being
(observer independent, infinite) and relative being
(observer dependent, finite), and notice the
differences between them. We draw issues on
relative causality and absolute causality among
abstraction levels. We also make reflections on
determinism. We reject the search for any
absolute truth (because of their infinity), and
prom ote the idea that all comprehensible truths
are relative, since they were created in finite
contexts. This leads us to suggest to search the
less-incompleteness of ideas and contexts instead
of their truths.
1. Introduction
As science, knowledge, and ideas evolve and are
increased and refined, the branches of philosophy in
charge of describing them should also be increased and
refined. In this work we try to expand some ideas as a
response to the recent approach from several sciences to
complex systems. Because of their novelty, some of these
ideas might require further refinement and may seem
unfinished1 , but we need to start with som ething. Only
with their propagation and feedback from critics they
might be improved.
We make a brief introduction to complex systems,
for then defining abstraction levels. Abstraction levels
represent simplicities and regularities in nature. We
make an ontological distinction of absolute being and
relative being, and then discuss issues on causality,
metaphysics, and determinism. These are in general
philosophical ideas, but they should be interesting for
researchers of complex systems, since they have
implications in the way we observe complex systems.
2. Complex Systems
Since complex systems can be found almost
everywhere and in a wide variety of contexts, it is very
difficult to abstract them into a well-defined, crisp-
bounded concept. But a loose-defined, fuzzy-bounded
concept is good enough for our purposes. M ore specific
definitions can be made in specific contexts. So, a
complex system consists of elements, which interact with
each other, with global properties of the system which
are not found on the elem ents. These properties are  said
to emerge from the interactions of the elements. The
complexity of the system is proportional to the number
of elements it has, to the number of their interactions,
and to the complexities of the elements and the
complexities of their interactions.
Let us now see some examples of com plex systems.
• A cell is formed by proteins and molecules, which
are not considered to be alive. But the elements of
the cell are organized in such a way that as external
observers, we judge that the cell is alive. Life
emerges from the interactions among different
proteins and molecules.
• A brain consists of billions of neurons. A single
neuron is not capable of controlling the body of an
animal, while neurons organized in a nervous
system are capable of providing adaptation to
animals, and in some cases intelligence and
consciousness. All these emerge from the neurons’
interactions.
• A society presents many properties that its
members cannot have by themselves, such as
collective behaviours, beliefs, and misbeliefs, that
may emerge from simple interactions among the
members (Gershenson, 2001).
• Cellular automata, such as the “Game of Life”
(Conway, 1982; Gershenson, 1997; Wuensche,
1998), consist of matrixes where each element has
a state or value. This state is modified through time
taking into account the states of the neighbour1Is there such a thing as a “finished idea”?
elements. Very simple rules for modifying states
yield to emergent complex global behaviour in the
system.
A complex system may consist of only two elements
(which in turn might be also complex systems). An
exam ple could be a symbiotic relationship between two
animals. Each animal would not survive as it does if it
would not be because of the relationship with the other,
so we can say that their survival emerges from their
interactions.
One of the main reasons for studying complex
systems is that this approach allows us to understand the
behaviour of the system by understanding the
behaviours and interactions of the elements. Following
Newtonian determinism, this lead people to believe that
if we could understand the “simple basic elements” of
the world (similar to the Greek concept of atom), we
could be able to understand all the world. But physicists
in search of these “simple basic elements” have found
more and m ore com plexity in subatom ic particles. Well,
there is no reason for why shouldn’t we be able to divide
anything, no matter how small it is. So, in theory, we
could say that we will never stop finding smaller
elements of our world, never finding the “real” atoms2.
But if we can find simple phenomena in different
contexts, ¿where does this simplicity comes from?
Similar to complexity, it also emerges. So we can speak
about emergent simplicity  and emergent complexity
(Bar-Yam, 1997). In a system, when the number of
elements and interactions is increased, the emergent
complexity is also increased, but not ad infinitum. Many
complex systems are characteristic because they present
self-organization. These systems are called complex
adaptive systems (CAS). Self-organization is given when
regularities begin to occur in the system. These
regularities give rise to emergent simplicity. How these
regularities occur is a very interesting question
addressed by researchers, but there is more than one
answer in dependence of the system. Some regularities
arise by bounds or limits of the system or of its elements,
others emerge from local rules that yield to a uniform
behaviour of the elements, and others we still do not
have a clue.
3. Abstraction levels
We do not know exactly how concepts are created
in our minds3, but we believe that they arise from
regularities in perception. Therefore, “simple” systems
will have a well-defined concept representing them
because of the regularities in the system. O n the other
hand, the more complex a system is, the harder it will be
to understand and to have clear concepts of it.
In our world, we can perceive simplicity at different
levels (e.g. atoms, proteins, individuals, planets,
galaxies). We call these abstraction  levels . Their
regularities and relative simplicity allow us to have clear
concepts of them, even when they might be composed of
many complex systems, because their global behaviour
is “simple”. Elem ents represented in abstraction levels
interact giving emergent complexity, until new
regularities arise, and we can distinguish another
abstraction level. Figure 1 shows some abstraction levels
that can be identified. From an abstraction level a
complexity level arises by emergent complexity, and then
another abstraction level arises from the complexity
level by emergent simplicity. Complexity levels represent
the complexity perceived in objects and phenomena, but
they are not well defined concepts. We draw two
complexity levels below subatom ic particles because we
suppose that they are divisible, and thus be a product of
emergent simplicity, but there  is no first abstraction
level. We believe that the universe (in the etymological
sense, this is, everything) is infinite (and if not, it behaves
as if it would be (we have not found limits)). Therefore,
it can be considered as an  abstraction level and as a
complexity level at the same time. We can have a
concept of it, but not because of its regularities, but
because of generalization. And the behaviour of the
universe as a system can be as complex and as simple as
we want to define it, because we cannot perceive such
behaviour. We call “big bangs” to phenomena similar to
the one it seems most of the matter we can perceive
came from. But since we believe the universe has no
limits in space or time (what would be on the other side,
then?), we believe that there should be an infinite
number of big bangs in different stages. Most people call
our big bang universe, but as we said, we understand for
universe everything.
2“Atom” comes from the Greek “J@:Z” (division)
and with the negative prefix “a” literally means “indivisible”.
3This also depends on our concept of “concept”. We
define a concept as a generalization of perception(s) or other
concept(s).
Figure 1. Some abstraction levels
Let us remember our loose and recursive definition
of com plexity: “the com plexity of the system is
proportional to the number of elements it has, to the
number of their interactions, and to the complexities of
the elements and the complexities of their interactions”.
Just like this, the definition is far from being practical.
Well, since we cannot find a “first” abstraction level, the
recursion in the definition has no end, so we cannot
speak of an absolute complexity. But we can take any
abstraction level as a point of reference that fits our
needs, and then we can have a  finite recursion , but we
would speak of a relative com plexity . Emergent
simplicity does not affect the definition of complexity,
but it should affect the reference point. For example, we
could say that the behaviour of a planet orbiting around
a single star is less complex than protein interactions in
the cell. But this is because the planet is simple at an
abstraction level, and this is its reference point. The
proteins are far from their closest lower abstraction level
because of their number and interactions. But if we want
to study a planet in terms of proteins, it would be much
more complex than a cell.
It has not much sense in studying, following the
previous example, a planet in terms of proteins, or
quoting Herbert Simon, a sheep in terms of quarks. This
is not because a quark cannot affect the behaviour of the
sheep, but because the effect of the quark can be
perceived in every abstraction level until reaching the
sheep. Causality cannot jump abstraction levels. But can
we speak about causality among abstraction levels? Yes,
but very carefully. First we need to make a small
distinction.
4. Ontology
We can define two types of being: absolute and
relative. Let us call the absolute being a-being and the
relative re-being. The a-being is the being which is
independent from the observer, and is for and in all the
universe. Therefore, it is infinite and uncomprehensible,
although we can approximate it as much as we want to.
The re-being is the being which is for ourselves, and it is
different for each individual, and therefore dependent
from the observer. It is relative because it depends on
the context where each individual is, and this context is
different for all individuals, and even the context of an
individual is changing constantly, with his or her
representations of what re-is. The re-being depends on
experience, reason, and beliefs, which in turn depend on
each other.
Objects do not depend on the representation we have
of them. The re-being depends on the a-being, but the a-
being... well, just a-is, independently from any observer.
A table may re-be nice and decorative for one person,
and the same table may re-be small but practical for
another person, and re-be ugly, tasteless and fragile for
a third person. But it a-is the same and one table,
independently of what it re-is for anyone. This does not
imply that the a-being cannot change in time nor be
dynamic. If the table burns it will a-be a different thing
that the one it a-was, also independently of what the
burnt table re-is for anyone. Figure 2 shows a graphical
representation of the ideas presented above: the a-being
contains different re-beings, which in turn  might contain
others, intersect, or be excluded. No re-being can
contain or be equal to the a-being, because this last one
is infinite, while all re-beings are finite. The larger the
re-being is, the less incomplete it is. The re-beings are
dynamic, and we believe that the a-being is also dynamic.
Figure 2. A-being and re-beings.
Another way of representing these ideas would be
with the following example: we have a ball, which a-is
50% white and 50% black. But we can only see it from
one perspective. So, for some of us the ball will re-be
completely white, for others it will re-be completely
black, or 70% black and 30%  white, etc. This is because
each one of us has a different perspective (context). And
our contexts do not affect the colour of the ball. We can
only get an idea of the complete colour of the ball by
taking into account as much perspectives (re-beings) as
we can. We cannot make an average, since most of us
could be watching it from the same perspective (for
example, we might conclude that it is 99% white). (Note
that a usual ball is not infinite as the a-being is). Figure
3 shows three perspectives of this supposed ball.
Figure 3. Which colour the ball a-is?
The being would be the conjunction of a-being and
re-being. Confusing? W ell, it would explain some
centuries of debates... For example, the old proverb: “if
a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to hear it
fall, has it really fallen?”. Well, the tree a-has fallen, but
noone could be able to represent it, so it re-has not
fallen for anyone. So the answer if we do not make the
previous distinction would be simply yes and no.
Another example can be found in the debate between
empiricism and rationalism. When empiricists spoke
about “being”, they referred to something closer to the
a-being, because things “were” (a-were) independently
from the observer, and we needed of experience to
perceive the “being” (a-being) of things. And when
rationalists spoke about “being”, they seem to have
referred to something closer to the re-being: “I think,
therefore I “am” (re-am)”. No wonder why there was a
strong debate if they were speaking about different
things trying to use the sam e concept.
5. Causality
Returning to our discussion about abstraction
levels: can there be causality among them? There re-is,
but there a-is not. Let us elaborate this idea. There can
re-be causality among levels because we define the
abstraction levels. W e define the concepts that are used
for identifying causality. For example, from one point of
view the behaviour of a society depends on the
behaviour of the individuals, but from another point of
view the behaviour of the individuals depends on the
behaviour of the society. We can speak about this if we
have a reference point, individuals in the first case and
societies in the second. But the a-being has no reference
point. There a-is no causality between individuals and
societies, because they a-are the same thing. Individuals
and societies re-are concepts that re-were abstracted
because of their regularities, but independently from us,
a society and the members that compose it a-are the
same thing4. Generalizing, if  we take a concept from a
certain abstraction level, the elements from lower
abstraction levels that compose it  a-are the same thing.
For example, a planet a-is all the atoms of the planet
interacting between them, producing several emergent
complexities and simplicities, allowing us to perceive
several abstraction levels. So, among abstraction levels
we can speak about relative causality, but not about
absolute causality5.
Can we speak about matter, then? Everything seems
to a-be only emergent properties of smaller complex
systems, but there is not a “basic essential” class of
elements. Everything a-is an infinitude of nothings6.
There a-is not an essence in the universe. Everything
a-is the essence. Everything a-is based on everything,
everything a-is related. There can re-be an much as
essences as we want, because we can take as a reference
point any concept we feel fit for being an essence. Or,
we could speak about a circular-relative causality,
because if we set as an essence a reference point, we will
return to that reference point if our context is complete
enough (e.g. individuals cause states of societies, and
societies cause states of individuals; atoms cause states
of molecules, molecules cause states of proteins,
proteins cause states of cells, cells cause states of
proteins, proteins cause states of molecules, molecules
cause states of atoms). If we expand our contexts
enough, we will approach what we just said: everything is
based on everything, because we will see that any
abstraction level has a causality (direct or indirect) on
any other abstraction level. Because everything a-is the
same thing. Of course, for studying and understanding
4We are not saying that independent individuals have
the same capabilities than their societies, but that all the
individuals, interacting, a-are the society.
5Remember we are speaking about causality among
abstraction levels, not about causality in time.
6I declare myself a monist, but not a materialist
(matter for me is also an emergent property).
our world we need to make use of our abstractions, and
set borders to our contexts.
And if we want to speak about causality in time, we
can see that it becomes very difficult to observe as the
complexity of a system increases. Mainly because of the
interactions among the elements of a complex system
determine the behaviour of other elements. The more
there are interactions, the more causes the behaviour of
an element will have. When a system is complex enough,
the causes become untraceable. If we try to find “the”
cause of something, very probably we will find ourselves
trapped in a “chicken-egg” “problem”, because if the
interactions of a complex system are very high. For
example, if  A is caused by B, C, D, E, F, G, and H, it is
very probable that any of these will be partly caused by
A. Mathematical models, such as random boolean
netw orks (Kauffma n, 19 93; G ersh enso n, in
preparation), show very clearly how the complexity (and
the tractability) of a system increases proportionally to
the number of interactions among elements. Therefore,
in cases of extreme complexity, we cannot study
causality of the elements in time, since everything depends
on everything. We can only study the system as a whole,
and try to understand the properties which arise by
emergent simplicity. Only at a system level we might be
lucky enough to find if a state of the system causes
another state of the system.
6. Metaphysics
Metaphysics can be seen as the axioms of
philosophy and thought. That is to say, metaphysics are
the ideas we believe in and base our reasoning upon.
Our reason cannot prove our beliefs in the same way
that theorems derived from axioms cannot prove the
axioms (Gödel, 1931; Turing, 1936).
For thinking and reasoning, we need basic ideas in
order to begin  thinking. These basic ideas would be our
metaphysics. We can then build new ideas over our
metaphysics, but this does not mean that our
metaphysics cannot change, even by the ideas based on
them.
But if in the universe there a-is no essence,
<and|or>7 everything a-is the essence, how can our
metaphysics, and all the ideas based upon them be
valid? They a-are not. They cannot a-be, because they
are finite, and our universe is not8. The question is to see
if they re-are valid. And the answer will be always yes,
because the ideas were created according to a specific
context, and they fit in that context. People do not make
non-valid ideas by their own will. Every idea is valid in
the context it is created. It is when we take an idea out of
its context that it might or not might be valid. Since
contexts are dynamic, when we make an error it is
because we expanded our context by perceiving
something which we were not aware of while we make
an error. Only after expanding our context we can
realize that we had an error, since it becomes non
consistent with the expansion of our context which
makes us realize of our error.
So all ideas have the same degree of validness? Of
course not. We can say that an idea is less incomplete  as
it is valid in more contexts. The more contexts an idea is
valid  in, and the wider these contexts are, will make the
validness of the idea h igher. An idea will never be
com plete, but we can make our ideas as less incomplete
as we want to. We can see that the search for truth is
obsolete if it is not relative to a reference point, because
an absolute truth a-is infinite.
With this we can explain why there have been
different explanations for the same thing. People look at
things from different contexts. Their context is finite and
re-is their personal essence. Therefore, they can explain
things in different ways. Which way is the “true” one?
We cannot say if it is not related to a reference point. If
we have two ideas from different contexts, explaining
the same thing, to see which one is “better”, we first
need to see “better for what”. An idea will be better for
something if that something is closer to its context than
to the context of the other idea. An easy example: which
one is “better”: neoliberalism or socialism? Well, we
need to specify better for whom. Each one is better for
people who obtain benefits from one or other.
Neoliberalism re-is good for businessmen, socialism re-is
good for workers. In this relativistic context, we can say
that Prothagoras and Methrodorus were right: “Man re-
is the measure of all things”, “All things re-are what
people think of them”. If someone asks: which one a-is
better, neoliberalism or socialism? I am afraid we could
not answer without falling into imprudence. It seems
that a system which would benefit both businessmen and
workers would re-be better than both socialism and
neoliberalism. And such a system would be less
incomplete, because it would be valid in the contexts of
the workers and of the businessmen.
7We use the notation <A|B> when we mean “A and
B at the same time”.
8Let us note that we are not saying that metaphysics
is not useful or needed. On the contrary. We are just noticing
its limits.
Different ideologies arise from different contexts.
But all contexts are incomplete. There cannot be a
completely valid  ideology. The ideas exposed here are
also dependent of their context. Once our culture
evolves,  and contexts are en han ced , their
incompleteness will make them obsolete. Any context,
no matter how less-incomplete it is, it will never be
complete, so it will not stop being relative. It is
fortunate, otherwise we would kill Philosophy.
So, if all ideas are relative to their context, and none
can be absolutely valid, how can we m ake science? W ell,
it seems that science does not intend to find absolute
truths, but to approximate them. Many ideas are valid in
all our contexts. We still cannot say that they a-are valid,
but we have a very high certainty of them. Anyway, if
they re-are valid in all our contexts, and they re-are not
valid  in others we do not know about, we can be
indifferent about it.
7. Determinism
Let us return to our statement from § 5, “everything
is an infinitude of nothings”. Is there determinism9
then? Well, we cannot say if there a-is or a-is not, but we
can see that there can re-be. Taking the popular
Heisenberg example from quantum mechanics: if we
cannot know the position and the velocity of a particle
without changing it, the behaviour of the particle re-is
uncertain . If the behaviour of all particles in the universe
re-is uncertain for us, can we speak of determinism? It
can re-be, because of emergent simplicity. The same
regularities that allow us to create abstraction levels
make the phenomena we call “simple” deterministic.
Subatomic particles or quarks may not a-be
determ inistic  per se, but their uncertainty does not affect
us. We do not know if they a-are deterministic or not.
Since they produce emergent simplicity, we can perceive
determinism in systems emerging from their
interactions. Also it seems that non-deterministic
behaviour is much harder to abstract. We can say that
there is a relative determinism where we have
abstraction levels, which tends to re-be non-
determ inistic  as it reaches a complexity level. In this
case, by non-deterministic we do not mean random, but
incomputable in a practical time10. We cannot determ ine
the behaviour of the system not because we cannot know
“how it works”, but because its complexity exceeds our
computing or perceptual capacities.
Are the emergent properties of a complex system
deterministic? We could say that they are if the elements
of the system from which the properties emerge are
deterministic. But since there a-is no “first” level of
abstraction, we cannot say if things a-are determ inistic
or not. But because of emergent simplicity there are
regularities in abstraction levels that re-are deterministic
to our eyes. So we can say that phenom ena re-are
determ inistic  if our models are congruent with our
perceptions “com pletely”. This means that m odels
simulate all the properties we perceive, which does not
imply that models a-are congruent with things.
We could say that one of the objectives of science is
to close the breaches between abstraction levels. This
does not mean that we will understand an abstraction
level completely, precisely because abstractions levels
are incomplete, but again, we can make them as less
incomplete as we want to. It does not matter how much
we increase our computing capacities. A computer, a
subset of the universe, cannot contain more information
than the universe itself11.
8. Conclusions
If science is enlarging our contexts, we need to
update our ideas in order to make them valid for our
ever expanding contexts. The present work is an attempt
for achieving this in the case of complex systems.
The distinction made between a-being and re-being
clarifies the indistinct and even more ambiguous use of
“being”. Apart from the ideas exposed, we can conclude
from this distinction things already noticed before, for
exam ple that we cannot speak of an absolute good or
evil (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche), but only of good and
evil relative to a reference point. We have also developed
ethics and aesthetics making this distinction of being.
But how to deal with the contradiction of having
two types of being? Logic  cannot accept contradictions.
Well, instead of trying to change situations according to
our logic, let us change logic according to our situations.
“Logic  is just a tool for reasoning, and does not
determine what things are” (Schopenhauer, 1819).
Paraconsistent logics (Priest and Tanaka, 1996) can deal
with contradictions. A n examp le of them is
multidimensional logic (Gershenson 1998; 1999), where
instead of having a truth value for a proposition, we
have a truth vector whose elements may be
9We shouldn’t confuse determinism with
predictability. Some chaotic systems are deterministic but they
are not predictable.
10Lyapunov exponents too high, making a system too
sensitive to initial conditions to be predictabe.
11Or could it? Only if the universe would be self-
affine (Mandelbrot, 1998), but it seems it is not...
contradictory. The result is that we can handle
contradictions by adding dimensions to contain them.
We stated that the ideas exposed here will not be
valid  as our contexts evolve. If they become invalid, then
our prediction will be true. If they not, the ideas will be
valid. This is a paradox, but it can be comprehended
with paraconsistent logics. And it seems that if we want
to be less incomplete, paradoxes cannot be avoided
anymore, but they need to be comprehended12.
Another important conclusion is that since all our
ideas are relative, we should not search for the truth of
our ideas, but for their less-incompleteness. All ideas are
valid  in the context they were created in, and no idea is
completely valid, since our contexts are finite and our
world is not.
We can conclude by saying that since all ideas are
valid  in the context they are created, we should tolerate
ideas generated in contexts different than ours. Instead
of denying something we do not comprehend, we should
try to expand our contexts to include as much ideas as
possible. The greater our contexts are, the less
incomplete and more correspondent with reality they
will be.
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